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Introduction

C

arbon taxes have recently become a major
source of discussion in the Washington, DC
policy community. Supporters contend that
they offer an efficient way to simultaneously create
incentives to emit less carbon dioxide and reduce
the budget deficit.1 Leading think tanks from
both the left and the right, including Brookings,
the American Enterprise Institute, and Resources
for the Future, have hosted dialogues on how to
structure the tax and use the revenues. Meanwhile,
lawmakers have proposed two carbon tax bills
during this congressional session: 1) Senators Boxer
(D-CA) and Sanders (I-VT) put forward a plan to
assess coal, oil, and gas producers a $20-per-ton
carbon tax2; and 2) Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA),
along with Rep. Blumenauer (D-OR) and Senators
Whitehouse (D-RI) and Schatz (D-HI) released a
discussion draft of a bill that would impose a fee
of between $15 and $30 per ton on greenhouse gas
emissions from power plants, factories, refineries,
and other major emitters of carbon dioxide.3
Should such a carbon tax be enacted, it will in all
likelihood be accompanied by measures to ensure
that the U.S. industries that would be most heavily
affected by the tax are not placed at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to competitor producers
operating in countries that have not imposed
any restrictions or taxes on carbon usage. Any
such efforts to “level the playing field” will raise
numerous questions regarding their compatibility
with U.S. international obligations, especially their
A 2012 Congressional Research Study found, under one
scenario, that a $20 per ton carbon tax, escalating by 5.6 percent
annually, could cut the projected 10-year deficit by roughly 50
percent (from $2.3 trillion down to $1.1 trillion). See “Carbon
Tax: Deficit Reduction and Other Considerations,” CRS 7-5700,
September 17, 2012.

1

2
The Climate Protection Act of 2013, S. 332, 113th Congress,
February 15, 2009.
3
Broder, John M. (March 12, 2013), “Lawmakers Release
Carbon Emissions Tax Plan,” New York Times, http://thecaucus.
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/representatives-release-carbonemissions-tax-plan/.

legality under agreed upon rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and in particular, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4
Can such a carbon tax be applied in a way that
does not violate U.S. obligations under the WTO
Agreements?5 I believe the answer is yes, provided
that policymakers carefully design such a tax,
keeping in mind the basic requirements of the
WTO not to discriminate in favor of domestic
producers or to favor imports from certain countries over others. The key is to structure any accompanying border measure as a straightforward extension of the domestic climate policy to imports. If so
designed, there should be few questions about the
measure’s consistency with the WTO rules. Even if
questions were raised, the United States would have
strong defenses within the WTO system. And even
if those defenses were somehow to fail, the United
States would be able to make adjustments should
some aspect of its carbon tax system be found
wanting. A non-discriminatory tax enacted in good
faith to address climate change should pass muster
with the WTO. Therefore, the threat of WTO
challenges should not deter policymakers from
adopting a carbon tax system now.
While a number of carbon reduction schemes, including a capand-trade or emissions trading system, could raise issues under
various parts of the WTO Agreement, including in particular
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, this paper focuses
on the rules that would be applicable to a tax (i.e., a compulsory
contribution imposed by the government for which taxpayers
receive nothing identifiable in return). It is presumed that the
main base of such a “carbon tax” would be the carbon dioxide
emissions of fossil fuels, with the amount of the tax and its
method of calculation to be determined by policymakers.

4

An extensive body of literature has been created on the
intersection between climate change policies and international
trade rules. A thorough bibliography of that literature can
be found in many of the works cited in this paper, including
WTO-UNEP Report (2009), Trade and Climate Change, www.
wto.org; Hufbauer, G., Charnovitz, S., and Kim, J. (2009), Global
Warming and the World Trading System, Peterson Institute
for International Economics, Washington DC.; and Houser,
T. Bradley, R., Childs, B., Werksman, J., Heilmayr, R. (2008),
Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: International Competition and
U.S. Climate Policy Design, Peterson Institute for International
Economics and World Resources Institute, Washington DC.

5

Changing Climate for Carbon Taxes

1

The key is to structure
any accompanying
border measure as
a straightforward
extension of the
domestic climate policy
to imports.
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The Simple Path

Carbon Tax on U.S. Production
and Use of Fossil Fuels

T

he United States, like all sovereign nations,
is free to adopt any tax system or policy it
chooses, including any that would tax the
generation of power, the production of fossil fuels,
and/or the major users of such power or fuels,
with the amount of the tax being calibrated to
the volume of carbon dioxide emitted in either
the production or the burning of those fuels or
the generation of power. If the United States were
simply to impose its own carbon tax on U.S. power
producers and/or U.S. producers of coal, oil, gasoline, natural gas, or other fuels, and even to extend
it to all domestic users of fossil fuels or the power
generated using those fossil fuels, there would be
no potential for international trade law violations.
Indeed, policymakers are free to structure such
a domestic carbon tax as they see fit, including
the initial amount of the tax; any change in the
tax amount over time; and any methodology for
assessing how much, if any, producers of downstream products such as aluminum, cement, steel,
paper, chemicals, and other energy intensive industries would pay.6 Complications only arise should
policymakers choose to go beyond a tax applied to
any or all domestic producers or users of carbon
and tax or place restrictions on foreign goods or
companies.

Application of the Carbon Tax to Imports?
The four most frequently cited rationales for
moving beyond a tax on U.S. producers and users
of carbon are:7
1. Competitiveness: the need to “level the playing
field” between those domestic producers
subject to carbon taxes that raise their costs
and those producers elsewhere who are not
subject to additional carbon-related costs;8
2. Transition assistance: the need to give time or
financial assistance to energy-intensive industries to help them transition to a lower carbon
emissions world;9
3. Leakage avoidance: the need to discourage
carbon-intensive industries from moving out
of the United States to countries that do not
have taxes or caps on carbon, as such moves
would be both damaging to the U.S. economy
and its workers, and undermine the goal of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; and
See, for example, Werksman, J., Bradbury, J.A., and Weisher, L.
(2009), “Trade Measures and Climate Change Policy: Searching
for Common Ground on an Uneven Playing Field,” World
Resources Institute Working Paper, December 2009.; and Cosbey,
A., Dorege, S., Fisher, C., Reinaud, J., Stephenson, J., Weisher, L.,
and Wooders, P. (2012), “A Guide for the Concerned: Guidance on the Elaboration and Implementation of Border Carbon
Adjustment,” Policy Report 03, Entwined, November 2012 (p.7).

7

The United States Senate, for example, voted 95-0 in favor
of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which expressed concern that
the disparity of treatment under the Kyoto Protocol between
developed and developing countries, and those countries that
were signing on to the Protocol and those that were not, “could
result in serious harm to the United States economy, including
significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and
consumer costs, or any combination thereof.” S. Res. No. 98,
105th Congress (July 25, 1997).

8

See Houser et al. (2008), p. 7 noting the U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration, manufacturing
Energy Consumption Survey data, for example, that energy costs
are 21.73 percent of the value of paper pulp, 31.79 percent of
the value of alkalies and chlorine production, 19.19 percent of
the value of nitrogenous fertilizers, 16.58 percent of the value of
cement production, 11.62 percent of the value of steel, and 19.83
percent of the value of aluminum.

6

The studies on which industries would be most affected by
requirements to reduce carbon dioxide emissions generally focus
on the “trade-exposed, energy-intensive” sectors, with the agreed
upon usual suspects including iron and steel, chemicals, pulp
and paper, fertilizer, cement, aluminum, glass, and sometimes
mining or petroleum. See Cosbey, A. (2009), Border Carbon
Adjustment: Questions and Answers (But More of the Former),
Background Paper, IISD, October 2009.

9
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Complications only arise
should policymakers
choose to go beyond
a tax applied to any or
all domestic producers
or users of carbon and
tax or place restrictions
on foreign goods or
companies.

4. Free riders: the need to encourage other
countries to limit carbon emissions rather than
benefiting from a system in which others tax or
limit carbon usage but they do not.

rationales, particularly that of competitiveness,
will motivate lawmakers to apply the carbon
tax to imports as well as domestic products and
producers.

Should the United States Congress enact a carbon
tax, it is highly likely that one or more of these

4
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Adding Complications:
Equivalent Tax on Imports

T

he most likely form of this extension would
be an equivalent tax imposed on imports, as
this is the clearest way to “level the playing
field” between U.S. producers and their overseas
competitors. How other members of the WTO
would respond to such a tax on their imports would
likely depend quite significantly on how the tax was
designed and whether other countries perceived
that their rights under the WTO Agreements were
violated.
Internal Charge? GATT Article II versus Article III
The United States has a right under either of two
potentially applicable provisions to assess a carbonrelated tax or a charge on imports — called for
purposes of this article a Border Tax Adjustment
(BTA) — provided such a BTA does not exceed
the amount of the tax imposed on similar U.S.
products. If the BTA were considered a “customs
duty” or a “charge imposed on or in connection
with importation,” then the BTA would be subject
to the restrictions of Article II of the GATT. Article
II generally prohibits countries from imposing
any customs duties that exceed the amounts they
agreed to charge in their tariff schedule, but would
allow an import duty such as a BTA that exceeds
these limits if it were considered to be a “charge
equivalent to an internal tax.”10 If, on the other
hand, the BTA were considered to be an “internal
tax or internal charge” because it is paid, for
example, upon resale of the product in the United
States, then it would be subject to the restrictions in

11

Article III of the GATT. Article III does not place
any quantitative limits on “internal charges,” but
contains the basic obligation that countries cannot
treat imports less favorably than they treat their
own domestic products.

How other members
of the WTO would
respond to such a tax
on their imports would
likely depend quite
significantly on how
the tax was designed
and whether other
countries perceived that
their rights under the
WTO Agreements were
violated.

Both Article II.2 and Article III.2 permit countries
to impose taxes or charges on imports, provided:
1) that the BTAs are imposed on products that are
“like” the domestic products that are subject to
the tax in the first place; and 2) that the amount
of the BTA imposed on the imported goods does
not exceed the amount of the tax on the domestically produced “like” products. Because of this,
the GATT consistency of the carbon tax BTA
should not turn on whether the BTA is designed
as a “customs duty” or as an “internal charge,”
but rather on whether the BTA satisfies the two
conditions contained within both Articles II.2 and
III.2. It should be noted, however, that a number
of scholars believe that the disciplines on “internal
charges” under Article III.2 are less stringent than
those on customs duties under Article II.2.12

The criteria for distinguishing between an “import” tax or
“ordinary customs duty” subject to Article II versus an “internal”
tax subject to Article III was recently spelled out by the WTO’s
Appellate Body in a case involving China’s regime for imposing
charges on automobile parts imported into China. The Appellate Body found that the distinction turns on what triggers the
obligation to pay the charge. If the obligation to pay “accrues
because of an internal factor (e.g., because the product was
re-sold internally or because the product was used internally),
then it falls under Article III (para 164). If the obligation to pay
the charge accrues at the moment of and by virtue of importation, then the charge would fall under Article II as an import
duty (para 158). WTO Appellate Body Report, China – Measures
Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R,
adopted January 12, 2009.

11

See, for example, Pauwelyn, J. (2012), “Carbon Leakage
Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO Law,” forthcoming in Prevost, D. and Van Calster, G. (eds.), Research Handbook on Environment, Health, and the WTO, Edward Elgar, 2012,
www.ssrn.com/abtract=2026879. Professor Pauwleyn argues that
“to attract the more permissive GATT Article III, carbon taxes or
charges on imports” should be designed to be triggered not by
importation as such, but by the sale, distribution, or use of the
product once imported (emphasis added) p.24.

12

Article II:2 of the GATT provides that countries are not
prevented from “imposing at any time on the importation of
any product . . . a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed
consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of (GATT)
Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of
an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.”

10
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Indirect versus Direct Tax

The simplest and most
likely WTO-consistent
path for policymakers
would be to impose a
carbon tax on products
— both domestic and
imported — at the
time of their sale,
distribution, or transfer.

In order to pass the first test under Article II.2
or III.2, requiring the tax be applied only to like
products, the country must show that: 1) the tax
is imposed on a product (a so-called “indirect
tax”) and not on a producer or manufacturer or
their income (a “direct tax”); and 2) the imported
products that are subject to the BTA are “like” the
domestically produced products subject to the
domestic tax. The general notion is the countries
can offset (i.e., adjust at the border) taxes they
charge on products — such as sales taxes, VAT
taxes, and excise duties — if they are assessing
similar taxes on domestically produced goods. Such
taxes applied to both imports and domestic goods
would simply level the competitive playing field
between the imported and domestic product.13 It
is equally generally accepted that direct taxes on
income or production, such as corporate income
taxes, Social Security taxes, payroll taxes, and property taxes, cannot be offset or assessed on imports,
because there is neither a way of knowing whether
the producers of the imports bore similar costs in
their production nor a way to allocate the direct
taxes on producers to specific products.14
As such, the simplest and most likely WTOconsistent path for policymakers would be to
impose a carbon tax on products — both domestic
and imported — at the time of their sale, distribution, or transfer. The tax could be applied to any
The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (ASCM) defines “indirect taxes” as “sales, excise,
turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and
equipment taxes, border taxes, and all taxes other than direct
taxes and import charges.” GATT (January 9, 1995), Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, ADP/W/383, Note by
the Secretariat, footnote 58.

13

See WTO-UNEP Report (2009), pp. 103. The WTO’s ASCM
defines “direct taxes” as “taxes on wages, profits, interests,
rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and taxes on the
ownership of property” GATT (1995). The 1975 Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments noted that indirect taxes could be
adjusted at the border while direct taxes could not; this distinction was upheld in US-FSC, which ruled that the United States
could not rebate or otherwise adjust its direct taxes.

14

6

set of consumers, ranging from a tax on fossil fuel
producers based on the carbon content of their
products to a tax on all businesses and consumers
based on the carbon content of the goods that
they buy or sell, assessed when the goods are sold.
The more that the tax is described as and calculated based on the goods themselves and the less it
sounds like a tax on income or ownership, the more
likely the tax is to be considered an “indirect tax.”15
While the amount of the tax would reflect the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted during production, because it would be assessed on the product
itself, the tax should be considered an indirect tax
fully eligible for border adjustment for imports.16
Even if the carbon tax (and the corresponding
The ASCM excludes from the definition of a subsidy the
exemption of exported products from the payment of duties or
taxes “borne by the like product when destined for domestic
consumption,” thereby suggesting that the closer the tax is to a
tax on the consumption of the good, the more likely it is to be
considered an indirect tax that can be offset or applied at the
border to imports.

15

Because the ASCM definition of “indirect taxes” includes “all
taxes other than direct taxes,” a carbon tax on products, even
though it reflects a tax on inputs (energy) that are not physically incorporated into the final product should fall within the
definition of an “indirect” tax, since it is not among the items
specifically listed as “direct taxes” and is not in the nature of an
income or wage tax. Moreover, past precedent would suggest
that domestic taxes on inputs can be applied to imports as
well. In both its Superfund legislation regulating hazardous
chemical waste, and in reducing the amount of ozone-depleting
substances that could be either produced or imported under the
Montreal Protocol, the United States imposed a domestic tax on
the chemicals at issue and a tax on imports of such chemicals or
products containing or produced with such chemicals. Neither
of these two schemes was found to violate the United States’
international trade obligations. The 1987 GATT panel report in
the US-Superfund dispute permitted the application of the tax to
imports that had used the requisite chemicals “as materials in the
manufacture or production” of the imports, while the application of the tax on ozone-depleting substances was not subject
to a GATT decision. GATT Panel Report, United States-Taxes
on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (“US – Superfund”), L/6175, adopted June 17, 1987, BISD 32S/136 at para 2.5
and para.5.2.4. Certainly the intent of a carbon tax — to make
carbon-intensive products more expensive, thereby creating
incentives to reduce carbon emission — falls within the rationale
for consideration as an “indirect” tax that can be adjusted at the
border. It increases the price of the goods to which it attaches.
Therefore, permitting a BTA on imports maintains trade
neutrality between the domestically produced and the imported
goods.

16

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

BTA) were technically assessed to producers based
on emissions at their production facilities rather
than directly on the product when first sold, the
carbon tax and BTA could be considered to be
applied “indirectly” to products, in accordance with
Article III:2.
However, there may be a number of policy reasons
why members of Congress may prefer other forms
of a carbon tax than a tax on products — ranging
from taxes solely on the generation of power, to
taxes on the use, transportation, or distribution
of fossil fuels, to a tax on producers (rather than
their products) based on overall carbon emissions
at their production sites. The farther policymakers
move from a tax on products or the consumption
of products, the murkier it becomes as to whether a
domestically applied tax can be legally assessed on
imports under the GATT.17
How Much Is the Tax?
The second test under Articles II.2 and III.3
requires the amount of the BTA to be no greater
than the carbon tax applied to “like” domestic
production. This test requires the careful development of a system for setting the BTA such that
it does not run afoul of WTO/GATT rules. For
example, if the tax were assessed based on the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted in the production of a ton of steel, the U.S. government would
have to establish a process to collect the information needed to determine the carbon footprint of
each ton of imported steel. This could be done,
The difficulty in determining whether domestically imposed
taxes on inputs (including energy consumption) can be imposed
on imports relates to a number of open questions — whether
taxes on “processes” rather than “products” can be offset at the
border; how broadly the WTO’s Appellate Body will interpret
the key phrases in either Article II.2 (internal taxes “in respect of
an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced”—and whether the interpretation of “article”
includes energy— or Article III.2 (internal taxes . . .applied
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products”) and whether
a tax on the carbon dioxide emitted in its production can be
considered an “indirect” application of a tax.

17

for example, by requiring imported products to be
accompanied by a certification or labeling of the
relevant aspects of their production process and
related carbon emissions used in their production.18
The best system and one that would be least likely
to raise WTO concerns would determine the
carbon content of both domestically produced
and imported products on a product- and plantspecific basis.19 In the case of many traded manufactured products, the specific manufacturing plant,
its energy source, and the process by which the
product is produced substantially affect the carbon
footprint of the product; the best assessments of
carbon content would be at the level of a manufacturing facility. Steel, for example, produced in an
electric-mini mill that gets its power from a nuclear
plant would have a much smaller carbon footprint
than steel produced in a blast-oxygen furnace that
gets its power from a coal-fired plant. If all products
— both domestic and imported — were taxed using
the same methodology that reflects the amount
of carbon that went into their specific production
and that has, in that sense, become a part of that
particular product, then application of such a BTA
would be much less likely to run afoul of the WTO’s
non-discrimination concerns.
However, such a system may be difficult and
complicated to administer, particularly if both the
The certification and labeling process itself would need to
be one that does not place a greater administrative burden on
imports than is placed on domestic producers to certify their
level of carbon dioxide emissions.

18

What has to be avoided in determining the domestic tax
under one methodology (such as reporting of actual carbon
emissions on a per ton basis from a specific plant) while
determining the amount of the BTA by a different methodology
(such as a universally applicable benchmark). It is just this
sort of difference in methodology that was found to constitute
“unjustifiable discrimination” when the United States provided
individual baseline standards for U.S. gasoline producers but
required imports to meet a statutory baseline. See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline (“US – Gasoline”), WT/DS2/AB/R,
adopted May 20, 1996, DSR 1996:I.

19
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The farther
policymakers move
from a tax on products
or the consumption of
products, the murkier it
becomes as to whether
a domestically applied
tax can be legally
assessed on imports
under the GATT.

tax and the BTA extend to indirect emissions (such
as off-site generated electricity, heat or steam, or
transport emissions).20 Moreover, any such system
would likely need an appropriate alternative means
to set the carbon content of an imported good if
companies, importers, or countries were unwilling
or unable to provide the necessary data. The
safest alternative, from a WTO law perspective,
would be to assume that the carbon content of the
imported product is equal to the carbon content
of the like product produced by the “predominant
method of production” or even the “best available
technology” in the United States.21 Under such a
system, companies exporting less carbon intensive
products than those produced by the “predominant method of production” in the United States
still might be able to petition for recognition of
their less carbon intensive product and thus face a
smaller BTA if they could sufficiently demonstrate
that the production of their particular product was
less carbon-intensive.
The reason that the method of determining the
amount of the tax on the domestic product and the
corresponding BTA is so critical goes back to one of
the bedrock principles of the GATT: countries may
not discriminate against imports.22 Satisfying this
nondiscrimination principle will require a demonSee Cosbey, A. et al. (2012) for a discussion of guidelines that
could be used in determining how far a carbon tax and BTA
could be extended and various methods for benchmarking
carbon emissions.

20

When the United States imposed a tax on certain chemicals
(The Superfund Act of 1986), it adopted this exact system for
imposing a tax on imports produced with the specified chemicals. A GATT panel ruling in a dispute over this tax did not
find fault with the system of voluntary reporting backed up by
use of data from the U.S. “predominant method of production”
when the importer failed to provide information regarding the
chemical inputs used in its production. US – Superfund. For a
discussion of the practical difficulties of valuing carbon emissions, see WTO-UNEP (2009), pp. 101-102.

21

Article III:2 prohibits discrimination in the form of charges
“in excess of ” those applied to like domestic products; while
Article II only permits charges on imports which are “equivalent” to an internal tax.

22
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stration that the tax on the domestic product and
its corresponding BTA were determined on a fair
and objective basis that relates to the specific products being taxed and not their national origin.23 It
also means ensuring that the amount of the BTA is
not “in excess of ” that applied to domestic products
under Article III:2 or is “equivalent to” the charge
applied to domestic products under Article II:2,
even though the amount of carbon dioxide emitted
during their production — and consequently the
amount of the tax or BTA assessed — may differ.24
Some scholars would contend that any difference in the amount of tax assessed on domestic
products compared to the BTA runs afoul of the
WTO’s non-discrimination principle requiring that
“like” products be treated in the same way. They
would argue that a ton of aluminum produced
using a low-carbon source of energy in a very
efficient plant must be taxed in the same way as a
ton of aluminum produced in a highly inefficient,
high carbon emitting process since low-carbon
aluminum is “like” high-carbon aluminum. In
general, the WTO has determined whether products are “like” one another by examining their end
use, consumer tastes and habits, and their physical
Past challenges to import measures indicate that the stated
intention of lawmakers, particularly statements that the purpose
of a measure is to protect domestic industries, have been taken
into account in determining that a measure violates Article III:2.
See WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals (Canada-Periodicals), WT/DS31/AB/R,
adopted July 30, 1997, DSR 1991:I.

23

Recent cases decided under the WTO’s Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) Agreement may suggest that some less favorable
treatment or some “detrimental effect on a given imported
product” would be tolerated provided it could be explained
“by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of
the product.” Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic —
Measures Affecting the Importation and Sale of Cigarettes, WT/
DS302/AB/R, adopted May 19, 2005; Article 2.1 of TBT Agreement does not prohibit a detrimental impact on imports where
“such detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from
legitimate regulatory distinctions. ” United States – Measures
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/
AB/R, para 174; United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing, and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/
DS381/AB/R, para 215.
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characteristics, along with whether they compete
with each other. There is a general presumption
that if products compete with each other, they are
“like”; if they do not, then they are unlike.

less carbon tax depending on their level of carbon
efficiency, just as in the importing countries.25

However, most WTO decisions that have found
taxation systems to run afoul of the WTO’s nondiscrimination rules have been based on different
tax rates applied to products that have been claimed
to be different (e.g., Japanese sochu versus vodka)
based on a particular definition of the product.
Once the WTO determined, for example, that
sochu and vodka were “like” products, the lower
tax on sochu (which was domestically produced)
resulted in discrimination against the higher-taxed,
imported vodka. Here, however, the carbon tax
and the corresponding BTA would presumably
be the same regardless of the definition of the
product — $20 for every ton of carbon dioxide
emitted in its production. As such, the carbon tax is
much more analogous to the tax found by a GATT
panel not to violate Article III: the tax imposed
by the United States under its Superfund Act on
certain substances (used as inputs in the production process of certain chemicals), where the same
tax was applied to both domestically produced
products and imports if they were made using the
same inputs. Moreover, there is no evidence that
the imposition of a flat-rate carbon tax applied to
both U.S. products and imports would run counter
to the overall goal of Article III, that measures
should not be applied “so as to afford protection”
to domestic production, since presumably there are
both more and less efficient producers of products
in the United States who would be paying more and

Should the WTO nonetheless find no room in
Article II or Article III for the application of a BTA,
either because the WTO determines that the BTA
would treat “like” products differently by taxing,
for example, high-carbon steel more than lowcarbon steel or that the GATT rules do not permit
border adjustments for energy or fossil fuels since
those items were not physically incorporated into
the imported goods themselves, then the United
States would be well positioned to defend the BTA
under the general exception provision of Article
XX of the GATT. Article XX lays out a number of
specific instances in which WTO members may be
exempted from GATT rules. The two exceptions of
most relevance are paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article
XX, which permit WTO members to adopt policies
that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
or health (paragraph (b)), or which relate to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources (paragraph (g)). In order to justify its BTA, the United
States would need to show: 1) that its carbon tax
scheme along with the corresponding BTA falls
under at least one of the two exceptions (either
(b) or (g)) and 2) that the carbon tax/BTA system
satisfies the introductory paragraph (the “chapeau”)
of Article XX, which requires that the BTA not be
applied in a manner that would constitute “a means

The Alterative Path through Article XX

Past cases have indicated that even if products are found to be
“like” one another, distinctions may be drawn in the treatment
of the products without violating Article III’s national treatment
requirement, provided any resulting “less favorable” treatment to
imported products can be explained by factors or circumstances
unrelated to the foreign origin of the product. See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Mesaures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC-Asbestos”),
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted April 5, 2001, DSR 2001: VII, 3242,
para 100.; WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic —
Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes
(“DR – Cigarettes”), WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted May 19, 2005,
para 96.
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of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail” and is
not “a disguised restriction on international trade.”

Past cases would
suggest that
demonstrating that a
tax on carbon emissions
assessed both
domestically and at the
border on imports would
fit within either or both
of the requirements of
XX(b) or XX(g).

Past cases would suggest that demonstrating that
a tax on carbon emissions assessed both domestically and at the border on imports would fit
within either or both of the requirements of XX(b)
(necessary to protect human, animal, or plant
health) or XX(g) (relating to the conservation of
an exhaustible natural resource).26 Policies aimed
at reducing carbon dioxide emission could well fall
under XX(b) as, for example, necessary to protect
human beings from the negative consequences of
climate change (such as flooding or sea-level rise).
Equally, they could come under XX(g) as related to
the conservation of the planet’s climate, or its arable
land or livable oceans, along with certain plant and

Policies that have been found to fall within the realm of
paragraphs (b) or (g) include: 1) policies aimed at reducing the
consumption of cigarettes, protecting dolphins, reducing risks
to human health posed by asbestos, reducing risks to human,
animal, and plant life, and health arising from the accumulation
of waste tires (under (b) and 2) policies aimed at the conservation of tuna, salmon, hearing, dolphins, turtles, petroleum, and
clean air (under (g)). WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil –
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (“Brazil-Retreaded
Tyres”), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted December 17, 2007; GATT
Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importations of and
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (“Thailand Cigarettes”) DS10/R,
adopted November 7, 1990, BISD 37S/200; GATT Panel Report,
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (“US — Tuna
(Mexico)”), DS21/R, September 3, 1991, unadopted, BISD
39S/155; GATT Panel Report, United States – Prohibition of
Imports of Tuan and Tuna Products from Canada (“US – Canadian Tuna”), L5198, adopted February 22, 1982, BISD 29S/91;
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting Exports
of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Canada — Herring and
Salmon), L/6268, adopted March 22, 1988, BISD 35S/ 98; GATT
Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Automobiles (“US – Taxes
on Automobiles”), DS31/ R, October 11, 1994, unadopted;
EC-Asbestos; US – Gasoline; and US – Shrimp. When assessing
whether measures fall within XX(b), the test is: 1) whether the
policy for which the provision was invoked falls within the
range of policies designed to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health (here, within the range of those policies designed
to reduce carbon dioxide and 2) whether the application of the
measure (here, the carbon tax and the BTA) to imports was
“necessary” (here, to prevent carbon leakage). See Appellate
Body Report on US-Gasoline, p. 16.

26

10

animal species that might disappear as a result of
global warming.27
The harder task will be proving that the BTA meets
the twin requirements of the chapeau (no arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
and no disguised restrictions on trade), as very
few measures have survived scrutiny under the
chapeau.28 Those failing measures, however, have
included protectionist policies or protectionist
results seeking refuge under Article XX. A carbon
tax BTA, building on a policy that would probably create additional costs for U.S. companies in
the short term, would likely be seen as markedly
different. Congress could ensure this perception by
making clear that the BTA was adopted for reasons
relating to reducing carbon emissions, such as
creating incentives for all producers exporting to
the United States to lower their carbon emissions
or preventing leakage by discouraging companies from moving outside of the United States
just to avoid the domestic carbon tax. Congress
could further strengthen its case by affording each
company the opportunity to pay an individually determined tax that relates to their particular
production process. If Congress can take these
steps, then the BTA should clear the chapeau’s twin
hurdles.

27

See WTO-UNEP (2009), p. 108.

Of the more than a dozen cases in which countries have
invoked Article XX to justify measures that otherwise violate
provisions of the GATT, only two (EC-Asbestos and US-Shrimp)
(21.5) have met the Article XX “chapeau” requirements. See
WTO Secretariat, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice
Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b)(d) and (g), WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/203,
March 8, 2002.

28

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

3

A Further Complication:
Giving Credit Where Credit is Due?

Tax All Like Products Alike

W

hen imposing a BTA, policymakers
may feel compelled to take into account
whether the imports come from a
country that has already imposed its own set of
restrictions on carbon emissions — such as the
European Union, Australia, or New Zealand. Steel
producers in Germany, for example, already must
limit their greenhouse gas emissions or purchase
emissions trading permits, effectively putting a
price on their emissions, while steel producers in
India do not face such restrictions. The problem
for the United States will be that differentiation
in the BTA based on the country-of-origin of the
imports would most likely result in a violation of
the GATT’s “most favored nation” (MFN) principle,
which requires the United States to treat imports
from all WTO members the same in terms of duties
or fees. Such a policy of exempting some countries
but not others from the BTA would violate Article 1
of the GATT.29
If policymakers choose a tant pis approach, disregarding other countries policies, and apply the
same BTA to all imports, then Europe and others
could find a way to rebate to their own exporters
the carbon tax/BTA paid to the United States for
products sold in the United States. This approach
raises few WTO legal issues, but may raise diplomatic hackles from those countries that took action
to address climate change before the United States.
A Second Trip Down the Road to Article XX
If policymakers do attempt to take into account
the carbon policies of other countries, then the
United States would need to pursue an Article XX
defense, under which it would justify its violaGATT Article I requires that any “advantage, favor, privilege,
or immunity” granted with respect to any customs duties or
charges to any product originating in one country “shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in all other countries” who are members of the
GATT/WTO.

29

tion of the most-favored-nation principle through
recourse again to the GATT’s General Exceptions
for measures either necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life and health (XX:(b)) or relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
(XX(g)). In this instance, the application of the BTA
to some countries but not to others would need
to be justified. As noted above, past cases suggest
that a carbon tax and accompanying BTA scheme
would likely fall under either or both Article XX(b)
or Article XX(g), as the requisite showing that the
carbon tax scheme is necessary for the protection
of human, animal, or plant life or health (XX(b))
or relating to the conservation of an exhaustible
natural resource (XX(g)) should be readily demonstrable.
The more problematic aspect of all the Article XX
defenses has been meeting the dual requirements
of the introductory paragraph (the “chapeau”): 1)
that the measure is not applied in a manner that
would constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail” and 2) is not a “disguised
restriction on international trade.” Here, exempting
those countries that have their own climate policies
from the BTA would seem to fit within the first
requirement of the chapeau, as the “same conditions” do not prevail when some countries have
controls on carbon emissions and others do not. As
such, the “discrimination” resulting from exempting
some countries but not others from payment of
the BTA is neither arbitrary nor unjustified; rather
it would be based on an assessment of what other
countries have done to regulate and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A second type of discrimination claim might be lodged by developing and
least-developed countries. They may contend that
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC)’s principles of equity and “common
but differentiated responsibilities” require the
United States to give a break to those countries
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country-of-origin of the
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of the GATT’s “most
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principle.

that had very little carbon emissions in the past.30
Exempting countries that have done less to reduce
their carbon emission through reliance on equity or
common but differentiated responsibilities may be
harder to justify from a climate change perspective,
as the exemption would not obviously be granted in
furtherance of the goal of “conserving exhaustible
natural resources” or “protecting human, animal,
or plant life or health.” However, distinctions to
lower or exempt certain poor countries from the
BTA may also fall within the justifications that the
“same conditions” do not prevail in those countries
as they do in many of the larger exporter countries
Article 3 of the UNFCC provides: “The Parties should protect
the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the
adverse effects thereof.”

30

12

that have not adopted their own carbon emissions
schemes.
With respect to the disguised restriction on trade
clause, exempting some countries from a U.S.
import tax does not give U.S. producers an advantage (in fact, it slightly harms them) and does not
restrict trade. It simply ensures that imports pay
some of the cost of carbon emissions if they are not
already paying them at home. As such, provided
that the decisions on which countries are entitled
to exemptions or reductions in the BTA paid on
their products are made in a fair and open process
that objectively links the exemption to the carbon
reduction policies in place in the exempted country,
the exemptions should also pass muster under
the “disguised restriction on trade” pillar of the
chapeau.
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A Final Complication: Rebates to
U.S. Producers on Their Exports

T

he final fork off the simple path that policymakers could take would be to grant some
form of a rebate to U.S. producers who pay
the domestic carbon tax but ultimately export
their products. Without such an exemption, if few
countries impose their own carbon taxes or carbon
reduction schemes, then U.S. exporters would be at
a competitive disadvantage. Here again, the simpler
the carbon tax is, the easier it would be to rebate
the tax on exports consistent with the WTO rules.
A straightforward carbon tax imposed on a product
could be rebated as an “indirect” tax when that
product is exported, provided that the amount of
rebate is not more than the carbon tax paid in the
first place.31 Many would argue that the permission
for rebating a domestically paid carbon tax once
the product has been exported is broader than for

See GATT Working Party (1980), Border Tax Adjustments,
adopted December 2, 1970, L/3464, BSID 18S/97 – 109.
Footnote 1 to the WTO SCM Agreement, which makes it
clear the remission of taxes on domestic products when those
products are exported cannot be considered a subsidy as long
as the amount of the remission does not exceed the amount of
the domestic tax; and item (g) of the Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies contained in Annex I of the SCM Agreement, which
provides that remission of taxes on exports in excess of that paid
on the production and distribution of like products sold domestically constitutes an export subsidy.

31

the assessment of a BTA on imports.32 Certainly
the WTO rules on export subsidies permit a tax
on domestically produced fossil fuels to be rebated
when a product is exported, provided that the
rebate is not larger than the actual tax levied on
“like” products “when sold for domestic consumption,” and many would argue that this permission
extends to taxes on energy or fuel consumption, since those taxes are levied in respect of the
production of the goods.33 Thus, the debate on
whether to permit rebates of domestically paid
carbon taxes would likely focus more on political
questions than on WTO legality.
See, Pauwelyn, J. (2007), U.S. Federal Climate Policy and
Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law, Working Paper, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University, pp. 44; Hoerner,
J.A. and Müller, F. (1996), Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection
in a Competitive World, a paper prepared for the Swiss Federal
Office for Foreign Economic Affairs by the Environmental
Tax Program of the Center for Global Change, University of
Maryland College Park, pp. 47; Hoerner, A. and Muller. G
(1997), Using A Border Adjustment To Take The Lead On Climate
Change Without Encouraging Runaway Shops; Lodefalk, M. and
Storey, M. (2005), “Climate Measures and WTO Rules on Subsidies,” Journal of World Trade 39:1, pp. 23-44.

32

Footnote 61 to Annex II of the SCM Agreement provides:
“Inputs consumed in the production process are inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels, and oil used in the production
process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their
use to obtain the exported product.”

33
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Use of Import Tax Revenues

A

final important consideration for lawmakers
as they design a carbon tax scheme is how
to spend the revenues generated by such a
system. The most likely options include:

A significant allocation
to developing country
climate efforts would
help demonstrate
that the United States
seeks to use the BTA to
combat climate change
rather than protect its
own industries.

1. Using the revenue to reduce other taxes or the
deficit.
2. Rebating the taxes to the U.S. companies most
affected by the carbon tax.
3. Funding programs to support the development
of low-emissions technology in the United
States.
4. Helping developing countries, particularly
least-developed countries, reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate
change.
These fiscal goals are not mutually exclusive. The
revenues raised through a carbon tax could be
divided amongst these various ends.
Contributing a significant share of the revenues
raised through the BTA toward the fourth option
(helping developing countries respond to climate
change) would certainly strengthen the case that

14

the BTA does not violate WTO law. A significant
allocation to developing country climate efforts
would help demonstrate that the United States
seeks to use the BTA to combat climate change
rather than protect its own industries. More specifically, the allocation would indicate that the carbon
tax scheme and its accompanying BTA were not
designed to or applied as a disguised restriction on
international trade, strengthening the case that the
BTA would qualify for an Article XX exemption.34
Moreover, by contributing to international efforts
to combat climate change, the revenues from the
BTA would further demonstrate that the BTA is
part of a good faith effort by the United States
to achieve an international response to climate
change, recognizing the wider latitude given to
actions taken pursuant to international agreements
or efforts to reach such agreements.35
See, for example, US-Shrimp (21.5), where the fact that the
United States offered to provide technical assistance to develop
the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs) in third countries was
viewed as demonstrating that the U.S. ban on shrimp imports
caught without TEDs was not a disguised restriction on trade.

34

The WTO Appellate Body has stated its preference that
discriminatory measures be justified or taken based on international agreements, or at least as a result good faith efforts to
reach such agreements. US-Shrimp.

35
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Conclusion

I

f Congress enacts a carbon tax to address climate
change, streamline domestic energy policy,
raise revenues, or reduce distortions in the tax
system, it must be ready to address the competitiveness concerns of U.S. companies. It could do so by
applying the same tax to imports coming into the
United States as they apply to domestic goods in
order to ensure that everyone competes on a level
playing field and that everyone has the same incentive to reduce their carbon footprint. To ensure that
U.S. companies are not disadvantaged when they
try to export their products to foreign markets,
the carbon tax could be rebated to U.S. companies
whenever they export the products on which the
carbon tax was assessed.

within the parameters of an “indirect” tax on products rather than a direct tax on the producers themselves; and 2) that any parallel taxes on imports or
rebates on exports do not discriminate in favor of
U.S. products. Policymakers have sufficient latitude
within this framework to design and implement a
carbon tax system that represents a good faith effort
to reduce carbon emissions while encouraging
all other countries to cut their emissions too, all
while preserving the competitive position of U.S.
companies. Policymakers can be bold. The WTO
will recognize genuine climate change measures for
what they are and is unlikely to find fault with such
measures, provided they do not unfairly discriminate in favor of U.S. companies.

Each of these steps is permitted under the WTO
rules provided: 1) that the tax is designed to fall
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